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Leiter: Legal Realisms, Old and New

Seegers Lecture
LEGAL REALISMS, OLD AND NEW
Brian Leiter*
“Legal Realism,” whatever exactly it is, now has sufficient prestige in
many circles that scholars compete to claim the mantle of the “Realist
Program,” whatever exactly that is. Not all scholars do so, to be sure,
but many—from many different jurisdictions and disciplinary
backgrounds—claim the mantle, as the international conference last
spring on “New Frontiers of Legal Realism” at the University of
Copenhagen certainly attested.1 Scholars from Sweden, Denmark, the
United States, Canada, Britain, Romania, France, and South Africa were
all there as “legal realists”—or, at least sympathizers with legal
realism—and represented disciplinary backgrounds in law,
anthropology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy. But what does it
mean to be a “legal realist”? What unites the two most famous “old”
Legal Realisms—the American and the Scandinavian—with the “new
legal realism” invoked, variously, by sociologists, anthropologists, and
political scientists, among others?2 There are, of course, other “legal
realisms,” old and new, from the “free law” movement in Germany
more than a century ago,3 to the Italian Realism of the Genoa School
Karl N. Llewellyn, Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law,
Philosophy & Human Values, University of Chicago. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the conference on “New Frontiers of Legal Realism” sponsored by the
University of Copenhagen, May 29–30, 2012. I am grateful for the comments and questions
received on that occasion; I benefitted especially from presentations by and discussions
with Jakob Holtermann and Torben Spaak. I am also grateful to the audience for the
Seegers Lecture in Jurisprudence at Valparaiso University Law School in the fall of 2012 for
their challenging questions and feedback. Finally, I am grateful to Gabriel Broughton for
excellent research assistance in preparing the lecture for publication.
1
New Frontiers of Legal Realism, UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/
calendar/new-frontiers-of-legal-realism/ (last visited May 19, 2013).
2
See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New
Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997);
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008);
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009); New Legal Realism: Empirical Law
and Society, NEW LEGAL REALISM, http://www.newlegalrealism.org/ (last visited May 19,
2013).
3
See generally Gnavius Flavius, The Battle for Legal Science, 12 GERMAN L.J. 2005 (2011);
Christian Joerges, David M. Trubek & Peer Zumbansen, “Critical Legal Thought: An
American-German Debate”: An Introduction at the Occasion of its Republication in the German
*
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today.4 My focus, however, shall be on the old and new Realisms that
are probably most familiar. Is there anything they all share?
Let us start with the old, and, in particular, with an issue that should
not be taken for granted in this context: namely, whether anything
unites the Americans and the Scandinavians. H.L.A. Hart certainly
convinced a generation of Anglophone philosophers that “realism” was
a united philosophical front against his legal positivism,5 but it is now
common knowledge, I trust, among scholars that Hart misunderstood
the American Realists, indeed, even failed to understand that they were,
in fact, tacit legal positivists, committed more or less to his view of the
nature of law.6 It was Hart’s mistake to construe the American Realists
as interested, as he was, in analyzing the “concept of law,” that is, the
concept implicit in our ordinary talk about “this is what you must do
given the court’s decision” or “that’s impermissible, given the statute
passed by the legislature.” The American Realists were, by contrast,
mostly interested in understanding why courts decide as they do, not
what the ordinary person’s understanding of law was. To the extent
they presupposed views about the nature of law, as I have argued
elsewhere,7 they are views much closer to those of legal positivists who
believe that norms only count as legal norms in virtue of having the right
kind of social source acknowledged by officials in that legal system (for
example, enactment by the legislature).
If Hart’s misreading of American Legal Realism is now familiar, it is
less common knowledge, at least among Anglophone scholars, that Hart
probably did as badly in his representation of the Scandinavian Realists.
At a minimum, he was wrong, as far as I can see, to conflate Alf Ross’s
views with those of Axel Hägerström and Karl Olivecorona—to name
the three major Scandinavian legal realists—and he may have even been
wrong in his interpretation of Ross as well.8 My hypothesis, on which I
will elaborate shortly, is that American and Scandinavian Realism have
almost nothing—not nothing, but almost nothing—in common. That
they are both labeled examples of “legal realism” is probably a

Law Journal 25 Years Later, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1 (2011); Hermann Kantorowicz, Some
Rationalism about Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240 (1934); Herman U. Kantorowicz & Edwin W.
Patterson, Legal Science—A Summary of Its Methodology, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1928).
4
See, e.g., Riccardo Guastini, Rule-Scepticism Restated, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 138 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
5
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. VII (1961).
6
See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278 (2001),
reprinted in BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 59 (2007).
7
See id.
8
See generally 1 ENRICO PATTARO, THE LAW AND THE RIGHT: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE
REALITY THAT OUGHT TO BE ch. 8 (2007).
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misfortune and an accident of intellectual history.
While the
Scandinavians appear to have adopted the label “realism” to signal their
opposition to metaphysical idealists, who thought the nature of reality
was dependent on the human mind and its categories,9 the Americans
invoked the more colloquial sense of “realism” as being candid about
what really happens (especially when courts decide cases), without
sentimental or moralistic illusions.10
That the Scandinavians and Americans should turn out to be so
different is hardly surprising if we remember how utterly different in
professional background and intellectual interests the Americans and
Scandinavians were. The great American Realists—Karl Llewellyn,
Jerome Frank, Herman Oliphant, Walter Wheeler Cook, Max Radin,
Underhill Moore, Thurman Arnold, William O. Douglas, among
others—were law professors and lawyers, with no philosophical training
and, rather obviously, no aptitude for or interest in philosophical
questions.11 What they were all interested in, quite clearly, was how
courts actually decide cases and what lawyers and law students needed
to know if they were to reliably advise their clients about how they
would fare in the courts.
The Scandinavians were quite different: they were either primarily
philosophers (for example, Hägerström) or had formal training in
philosophy, and all were primarily academics and scholars who
conceived of their jurisprudential questions in philosophical terms. In
contemporary terminology,12 they were all occupied with variations on
what philosophers call the “location problem,” that is, the problem of
how to locate some phenomenon of interest—consciousness, say, or
moral value—in a world naturalistically conceived, that is, conceived in
terms that could be articulated nomically or at least causally by the
empirical sciences. In other words, how do we make sense of subjective
conscious experience, or of the idea that something is morally wrong, in
a world that we take to be exhaustively explained by physics, chemistry,
and biology? How can we locate the experience of Beethoven, or the
Hägerström is a case in point. See, e.g., PATTARO, supra note 8; see also PATRICIA
MINDUS, A REAL MIND: THE LIFE AND WORK OF AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM 48 (2009). Mindus
notes other writers’ skepticism about the lumping together of Scandinavian and American
Realism. Id. at 137 n.2.
10
See, e.g., Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurisprudence), 100
GEO. L.J. 865 (2012).
11
Felix Cohen is the exception, although his philosophy PhD served him badly. See, e.g.,
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935) (arguably adopting an indefensible version of rule-skepticism). For discussion, see
LEITER, supra note 6, at 68–73.
12
See, e.g., FRANK JACKSON, FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS: A DEFENCE OF CONCEPTUAL
ANALYSIS (1998).
9

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 4 [2013], Art. 5

952

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

sense that genocide is a moral abomination, in a world thought to be
composed of nothing other than physical, chemical, and biological facts?
For the Scandinavian Realists, the precise issue was how to locate a legal
system of norms in a world so conceived. None of them were, as far as I
can see, attracted to eliminativist solutions to the location problem, of the
kind that most naturalistic philosophers would adopt for, say, religious
discourse: the entities that religions refer to (gods, spiritual entities,
souls, non-physical forms of life) do not exist and so should be
eliminated from any realistic picture of what the world is like.
None of the Scandinavians, in short, wanted to draw the conclusion
that laws and legal systems and legal norms did not really exist, just
because the idea of obligations, duties, and rights did not figure in a
natural scientific explanation of the world! Rather, they wanted to find a
way of understanding legal norms that was compatible with a semantic,
metaphysical, and epistemological picture of the world in which there
were no objectively existing values or norms. In other words, if “norms”
about obligations, duties, and rights do not actually refer to things that
actually exist, how do we understand the meaning of legal rules that
refer to such entities? In this regard, H.L.A. Hart has much more in
common with Scandinavian Realism than his polemic in chapter seven of
The Concept of Law would suggest, since he accepted a similarly
naturalistic picture of the world.13 The Scandinavian response to the
location problem involved some mixture of non-cognitivism (and—
inconsistently at times—verificationism) about the semantics of
normative legal judgment,14 as well as psychologism about norms and
normative guidance to deal with the metaphysical and epistemological
issues. On the semantic side, judgments about legal obligations and
duties were interpreted as expressing certain non-cognitive attitudes or
feelings: a court’s judgment of the form, “Mr. Smith has a contractual
obligation to pay Mr. Jones $5,000 for those widgets,” really means
something like, “I, the judge, feel very strongly that Mr. Smith should
pay Mr. Jones $5,000 for those widgets, and if he doesn’t, I will sanction
him!” The Scandinavian Realist’s psychologism held that legal norms,
both their existence and their effects on behavior, were to be explained in
terms of the psychological states of persons who accepted these norms,
rather than the reality of the norms: that X believes or feels he has a duty

13
See, e.g., Kevin Toh, Hart’s Expressivism and His Benthamite Project, 11 LEGAL THEORY 75
(2005).
14
See Torben Spaak, Karl Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy: A Critical Appraisal, 24 RATIO
JURIS 156, 163–65 (2011); Torben Spaak, Karl Olivecrona on Judicial Law-making, 22 RATIO
JURIS 483, 493–94 (2009).
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or obligation is what is explanatory of behavior, not the existence of the
duty.15
A similar kind of psychologism is, I think, implicit in Hart, though
he sometimes cannot quite acknowledge it,16 perhaps because of the
influence of J.L. Austin’s ordinary language philosophy on his thinking.
But it is important to remember that it is central to Hart’s view that at the
foundation of a legal system—what makes a system of legal norms
possible—is just a complicated psychological and sociological artifact,
namely, that officials converge on certain criteria of legal validity and
believe themselves to have an obligation to apply those criteria.17 Thus,
the answer to the question why, for example, constitutionality is a
criterion of legal validity in the United States is, in the end, simply that
officials of the system treat it as one and believe (for whatever reason)
that they ought to do so. In short, I think the Scandinavians have far
more in common with the great Austrian legal positivist Hans Kelsen
and the great English legal positivist H.L.A. Hart than they do with the
American Realists: the latter want to figure out why courts decide as
they do and guide lawyers accordingly; while all the former—that is,
Kelsen, Hart, and the Scandinavians—are interested in traditional
philosophical questions about the metaphysical nature of law and how it
can be located within a naturalistic worldview, that is, one that takes for
granted that the world is, more or less, as the sciences describe it. Hart
and the Scandinavians differ from Kelsen in their willingness to think the
answer can involve “naturalizing” certain normative concepts in law,
that is, understanding them as complicated psychological and
sociological artifacts, and thus as part of what Kelsen would have
understood to be an “impure” theory of law.18

See, e.g., MINDUS, supra note 9, at 142 n.31 (noting that scholars in psychology used
suggestive effect to explain some problems with the human mind during the time of
Hägerström).
16
See generally Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for
Scepticism, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (2011).
17
Scholar Jakob Holtermann’s view is that Ross insists on treating even valid primary
legal rules as psychological artifacts, and thus denying the idea of derivations of validity
from a master rule of recognition, and that he is moved to this extreme position by classical
skeptical worries that are not peculiar to law. See Jakob v.H. Holtermann, Hart’s Criticism of
Ross, UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, http://jura.ku.dk/crs/english/calendar/hart-ross/ (last
visited May 20, 2013). I cannot comment on whether this is correct as an interpretation of
Ross, but it would seem to me to make his position less, rather than more, compelling,
depending as it does on skeptical worries of dubious merit and to which there are a
multitude of responses with which he was unfamiliar.
18
I’ve explored that possibility as well. See LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 6, at pt. II.
15
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There remains, though, one thin sense in which the Americans and
the Scandinavians do share something: namely, they are both skeptical
that the legal doctrine the judges invoke in their opinions explains their
decisions. Indeed, I shall take this idea—namely, skepticism about the
causal efficacy of legal doctrine (the “Skeptical Doctrine” for short)—to
be the central thesis of realists in all their many varieties.19 The
Scandinavians, as I understand them, actually hold the more farreaching version of this doctrine, since their skepticism is directed at the
idea that an abstract object like a legal norm or doctrine can figure in an
explanation of behavior, without reference to the psychological states of
persons (such as their “feeling bound”).20 Thus, their skepticism is not
confined to the causal efficacy of legal norms, but to all norms. By
contrast, the American Realists, the Italian Realists, the contemporary
political scientists who study the judicial process, and many others all
subscribe to the more mundane understanding of the Skeptical Doctrine:
the rules and principles the judges recite in their opinions do not reveal
the real reasons and motives for their decision or reveal them only
incompletely.
It is with respect to what I am calling the Skeptical Doctrine that it is
often said in the United States that “we are all realists now.” The antirealist reaction of the Legal Process School at Harvard in the 1950s
notwithstanding, during most of the post-World War II period in the
United States, most legal scholars responded with at least some
skepticism to the doctrinal rationales given for decisions in contested
cases, especially those that commanded the attention of the appellate
courts. The triumph of the Skeptical Doctrine in the United States
became clear with the rise of law and economics that began in the 1970s
and the short-lived fad of Critical Legal Studies in the 1970s and 1980s.
In the 1970s, Richard Posner at the University of Chicago, and then
others, argued that one could make much better sense of common law
doctrines across a range of fields by understanding them as enacting the
logic of economic efficiency—one could thus bypass the “official”
doctrine (for example, talk of “duty” in torts) in favor of an
economically-informed explanation of the pattern of decisions. 21 In the
19
I think Edmund Ursin is correct to argue that in the work of some American Realists,
especially Leon Green, there is a strong normative program that goes beyond the
Holmesian idea of making reliance on uncodified norms of actual practice explicit in
judicial decision-making. See generally Edmund Ursin, Clarifying the Normative Dimension of
Legal Realism: The Example of Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 487
(2012).
20
See, e.g., MINDUS, supra note 9, at 142 (describing Hägerström’s view of “the suggestive
effect” of legal norms).
21
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
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1980s, Critical Legal Studies writers tried to argue that the surface
doctrine of the private law, in particular, was best understood as
reflecting political choices between abstract, but conflicting, political
philosophies that were both allegedly implicit in the doctrine.22
Both these descriptive/explanatory programs were ultimately
failures, though economic analysis remains the dominant form of
normative analysis of legal problems in the United States. But the failure
to realize their grand descriptive ambitions co-existed with the
continued dominance of widespread commitment to the Skeptical
Doctrine, and in a form that would have been clearly recognizable to the
original American Realists of the 1920s and 1930s. Let me explain.
The American Realists sometimes paid homage to the social sciences,
even adopting the rhetoric of the then-dominant behaviorism in
psychology (for example, in their talk about the “stimulus” of the facts of
the case), but their actual scholarly practice was largely insulated from
the social science of the day—the unfortunate exception being Underhill
Moore of the Yale Law School, who squandered his days recording the
parking habits of New Haven drivers, and to whom we will return
shortly.23 This did not mean that the Realists were not interested in what
the courts do; rather, their approach to the facts about what courts do
almost entirely eschewed social scientific inquiry, and for good reasons I
think.24 The paradigmatic Realist inquiries of the 1920s, 1930s, and
after—Oliphant on the promise-not-to-compete cases,25 Llewellyn on the
New York sales cases,26 Green on “proximate cause” in tort law,27
Handler on trademark28—consisted in careful scrutiny of the underlying
facts of lines of cases, bringing out the gap between the official
“doctrinal” explanation for the decision and the actual sotto voce norms
of “decency” and the “felt sense” of “the right result on the facts of the
case and situation” that seemed to be at work in the judge’s thinking.29
22
See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
23
See Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal
Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943).
24
Theirs was a “naturalized” theory of adjudication, as I have argued. See Brian Leiter,
Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997),
reprinted in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 15. But while it took inspiration
from the social sciences, its actual methodology was a recognizably lawyerly one.
25
See generally Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928).
26
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 122–24
(1960).
27
See generally LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES (2d ed., 1939).
28
See Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and
Synthesis (pts. 1 & 2), 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1930), 30 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1930).
29
LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 135.
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The goal was to discover the non-legal norms that made best sense of the
courts’ response to recurring “situation-types,” i.e., patterns of fact that
seemed to elicit the same kind of results. So, in Oliphant’s famous
example (from an article titled importantly, A Return to Stare Decisis), he
denied that there was a single, general rule about the enforceability of
contractual promises not to compete: rather, courts enforced those
promises when made by the seller of a business to the buyer, but found
ways not to enforce them when made by a (soon-to-be former) employee
to his employer.30 In the former scenario, Oliphant claimed, the courts
were simply doing the economically sensible thing (no one would buy a
business if the seller could simply open up shop again and compete);
while, in the latter scenario, courts were taking account of the prevailing
informal norms governing labor relations at the time, which disfavored
such promises, especially given the inequality in bargaining power
between employees and employers. A meaningful doctrine of stare
decisis could be restored, on this account, by making legal rules more
fact-specific, i.e., by tailoring them to the underlying situation-types to
which the courts were sensitive.
So, too, Llewellyn noticed a line of New York cases applying the rule
that a buyer who formally states his objections to a seller’s shipment
“must be held to have waived all other objections.”31 Llewellyn noted
that the rule seemed fair in those cases where the buyer “ought to have
known or did know of the defect he failed to mention” and especially
when the buyer’s “silence has kept the seller from working a permissible
and possible cure of the defective tender, or has led to unwarranted
surprise in the litigation.”32 But Llewellyn identified a “curious pile of
cases in which courts normally sensitive enough to decency announce
and apply the rule in its crassest form,” that is, without regard to any of
the preceding considerations.33 Like Oliphant on the promise-not-tocompete cases, Llewellyn also found an underlying difference in the
situation-type characteristics of the cases where the rule about formal
notice of objections seems harshly applied: namely, that in all those
cases the alleged “defect in question does not appear to be the true
ground of rejection” but “rather . . . the market has turned sour, and the
buyer is seeking a purely legalistic out.”34 In other words, the court,
being “sensitive to commerce or to decency,” invoked the harsh rule on

30
See generally Oliphant, supra note 25 (discussing legal theory in the context of promisenot-to-compete case law).
31
LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 122 (citing Littlejohn v. Shaw, 53 N.E. 810, 811 (1899)).
32
Id. at 122–23.
33
Id. at 123.
34
Id.
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rejection in order to frustrate the attempt by buyers to escape contractual
obligations that, under changed market conditions, no longer seemed
economically attractive to the buyer. 35
This latter example actually creates a problem for the interesting
hypothesis, defended by Professor Alan Schwartz of Yale Law School,
that Llewellyn was really a proto-economic efficiency theorist of contract
law.36 Schwartz notices, correctly, that since Llewellyn thinks courts
generally treat the informal norms of ordinary mercantile practice as the
benchmark for their decisions, it would seem that courts generally treat
economically efficient norms as the benchmark—given the plausible
assumption that those engaged in a particular trade will gravitate
towards economically efficient norms governing their dealings. But the
example of the New York sales cases makes clear that Llewellyn thinks
there is a limit to the neoclassical economist’s interpretation of efficiency
in this context: for courts do not look favorably on “economically
efficient” breaches, which was precisely what was at issue in those cases.
They view such post-hoc attempts to escape economically unfavorable
contracts as unfair (even if they are welfare-enhancing in the economist’s
sense) and so will not permit them. So, contra the economic analysis of
contract law, American Realists like Llewellyn notice that courts actually
do care about the fairness or unfairness of contractual situation-types, at
least sometimes.
The extreme version of the Realist hypothesis that what really
explains appellate court decision-making is sensitivity to the underlying
“situation-type” presented by the case is perhaps most vivid in Leon
Green’s 1931 textbook on torts, which was organized not by the
traditional doctrinal categories (e.g., negligence, intentional torts, strict
liability), but rather by the factual scenarios—the “situation-types”—in
which harms occur:
e.g.,
“surgical operations,” “traffic and
transportation,” and the like.37 The premise of this approach was that
there was no general law of torts per se, but rather predictable patterns
of torts decisions for each recurring situation-type that courts encounter.
That the preceding examples illustrate the heart of the Realists’
“empirical” method explains, of course, why the Realists were so
influential in American law: you did not need social science training to
do this kind of analysis, you just needed to be a sensitive and skeptical
reader of court opinions—something good lawyers are, in fact, good at.
Id. at 124.
See generally Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody S. Kraus &
Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
37
See GREEN, supra note 27.
35
36
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Even my late University of Texas colleague Charles Alan Wright, lead
author of the preeminent treatise on American civil procedure, described
himself to me as a “legal realist,” for he took the task of his great
procedure treatise to be the same as Oliphant’s approach to the promisenot-to-compete cases: that is, to describe the rules of procedure at a
greater level of factual (“situation-type”) specificity, a level that would
enable lawyers to accurately predict what the courts will do. Another
former Texas colleague, Douglas Laycock—now at the University of
Virginia—is, among other distinctions, the leading American authority
on the law of remedies, though not one who thought of himself as a
Legal Realist. Yet his classic debunking of what American courts call
“the irreparable injury rule” is a case study in “Realist” analysis, as I
eventually persuaded him.38 The irreparable injury rule states courts
will not enjoin misconduct when money damages will suffice to
compensate the victim; only when the harm would be “irreperable” will
courts issue an injunction, according to the rule.39 Laycock reviewed
more than 1,400 cases and concluded:
Courts do prevent harm when they can. Judicial
opinions recite the rule constantly, but do not apply
it. . . . When courts reject plaintiff’s choice of remedy,
there is always some other reason, and that reason has
nothing to do with the irreparable injury rule. . . .
....
. . . An intuitive sense of justice has led judges to
produce sensible results, but there has been no similar
pressure to produce sensible explanations.40
Like the old realists, Laycock finds a disjunction between the “law in the
books” and the “law in action,” and, also like the realists, he invokes as
an explanation for that disjunction the decision-makers’ “intuitive sense
of justice.”41 So, too, following in Oliphant’s footsteps, Laycock seeks to
reformulate and restate the rules governing injunctions to reflect the
actual pattern of decisions by the courts following their intuitive sense of
justice.
So how did the myth arise that the American Realists were protosocial scientists, forerunners, say, of the political science work on courts
championed by Frank Cross, Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, Harold Spaeth,

38
39
40
41

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/5
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and Emerson Tiller, among many others, or inspirations for the “law and
society” interest in qualitative studies of the law “in action”? Without a
doubt, both the political scientists and the law-and-society scholars
benefitted from the Realist defense of the Skeptical Doctrine: it opened
the door to the idea that to understand how the law really works, it is not
enough to know legal doctrine. In that sense, these recent developments
are “realist” in the sense of depending upon the Skeptical Doctrine. And
without a doubt the American Realists share with the social scientists the
ambition of making the study and understanding of law “scientific,” but
they shared that ambition with Christopher Columbus Langdell,
inventor of the case method, as well.
Let us remember that the idea that only a Wissenschaft (the German
word typically translated “science”) was a proper object of university
study, the idea that arose with the birth of the modern research
university in Germany in the early 19th century, was taken for granted
by almost everyone in the Anglophone world in the late 19th and early
20th century. The Anglophone word “science,” alas, has a connotation
of “natural science” that is absent in the German; the original idea of a
Wissenschaft is simply of a rigorous method or discipline for acquiring
knowledge, a method or discipline that when correctly followed secures
the reliability of its results. The natural sciences, to be sure, are our
preeminent examples of successful Wissenschaften, and it was the natural
sciences that both Langdell and the American Realists had in mind in
their own quest to establish law as a Wissenschaft. But, whereas Langdell
thought the legal reasoning of the courts, as expressed in their opinions,
were the data on which the science of law should be based, the American
Realists objected that those opinions were more often post-hoc
rationalizations than illuminating about the actual causal explanation for
decision. To really understand the decisions, the American Realists
noticed, you had to pay attention to the underlying facts of the cases—
the “situation-types” as we have seen—and the informal and not fully
articulated norms that inform the judge’s response to those situationtypes. That, for the American Legal Realists, was the essence of a legal
Wissenschaft. And a smart Realist lawyer could be a practitioner of this
Wissenschaft without becoming a social scientist with physics envy.
So whence the idea that the American Realists wanted to bring
social-scientific methods to the study of law, that they not only opened
the theoretical door for such work, but were advocates, proponents, even
practitioners of it? This latter myth has two primary sources: first, the
unfortunate but cautionary tale of Underhill Moore mentioned already;
and, second, the fact that Karl Llewellyn collaborated with an
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anthropologist to study the customary practices regulating the social life
of the Cheyenne Indians.42 Let me take these up in turn.
In my own work, I am indebted to the legal historian John Henry
Schlegel of the State University of New York at Buffalo for introducing
me systematically to Underhill Moore’s work in Schlegel’s valuable book
on American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science.43 Schlegel adduced
the evidence that various American Realists expressed curiosity about
the social sciences and talked about how the social scientific study of law
might be useful and interesting, and so on, but he found only one real
practitioner, namely, Underhill Moore.44 Moore, alone among his fellow
American Realists, took the state-of-the-art of contemporary social
science seriously; unfortunately for Moore, the state-of-the-art was
Watsonian behaviorism. (B.F. Skinner made the behaviorist doctrine
famous, but John Watson was the ‘founder’ as it were.)
The
psychological behaviorists thought of themselves as bringing the
methods of the natural sciences to bear on human beings, and, since it
was central to natural scientific method that sensory experience is the
source of all genuine knowledge, the behaviorists thought it imperative
to limit themselves to the only aspect of human psychology available to
direct observation: namely, what stimuli affect people and what
behavior results. (This was itself a caricature of natural-scientific
method, but that need not concern us here.) What resulted was one of
the great travesties in the history of the human sciences: decades of
largely trivial or uninteresting attempts to discover the laws of causeand-effect governing observable stimuli and behavioral responses of
persons, with the actual content of the mind (beliefs, desires, and the
rest) taken to be off-limits to scientific psychology. Noam Chomsky
initiated the destruction of the behaviorist program starting in the 1950s,
and today, of course, the “cognitive” revolution, the idea that what goes

42
Thanks to Fred Schauer for pointing out the significance of this aspect of Llewellyn’s
work to the long-term perception of Realism.
43
See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
44
There was, to be sure, empirical legal research being done in the 1920s and 1930s, but
almost none of it was done by scholars who were identified with, or self-identified with,
Legal Realism. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The (Nearly) Forgotten Early Empirical Legal Research,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M.
Kritzer eds., 2010). The main exception was Douglas’s early work on bankruptcy, which he
soon left behind once he joined the Roosevelt Administration. Id. at 879, 889. Charles
Clark, less a theoretician of Realism but certainly sympathetic, also did (or at least
supervised) some empirical work on aspects of the civil justice system. Id. at 879, 887.
Strikingly, Kritzer makes no mention of Underhill Moore, perhaps for good reason.
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on in the mind, even if not directly observable, is central to an adequate
psychological theory, predominates.45
Alas, poor Underhill Moore, without any independent critical tools
in his intellectual arsenal, took the behaviorist research program
seriously. Other American Realists were aware of that program, of
course, and it showed up in their rhetoric, such as Oliphant’s fondness
for the rhetoric about the “stimulus” of the facts of the case and the
“response” of the judge.46 But only Moore, among all the American
Realists, thought that a properly scientific study of law—“science” being
the marker of a mature intellectual discipline, fit for university study, as
we have already noted—would actually dispense with talk about what
judges believed or thought in explaining court decisions.47 The endpoint
of this trajectory of research was the lead article in the Yale Law Journal of
1943 analyzing the parking practices of New Haven drivers when the
parking signs changed. Among his discoveries: when the signs
changed, not all drivers noticed right away. But giving tickets helped
change their parking habits. Such was the state-of-the-art behavioral
legal science in the 1940s.48 Some twenty years later, with Moore’s
general approach in mind, Llewellyn wrote dismissively in The Common
Law Tradition that “[a]n appellate judge is not Pavlov’s dog.”49
The failure of Moore’s research program should certainly give
today’s enthusiasts for social-scientific approaches to law pause. Moore
had undoubtedly tapped into the dominant research paradigm among
psychologists, and he was not, as far as I can tell, an inept practitioner of
it. But Moore hitched his wagon to a failed research program, and its
45
The behaviorist research program regarding human behavior is not wholly defunct, as
Jeff Rachlinski points out to me: it is still thought to be illuminating with regard to the
behavior of addicts, who no doubt have more in common with pigeons than most people.
46
See Oliphant, supra note 25, at 75.
47
See generally Underhill Moore & Theodore S. Hope, Jr., An Institutional Approach to the
Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929); Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman,
Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts—VI. The Decisions,
the Institutions, and the Degrees of Deviation, 40 YALE L.J. 1219 (1931); Underhill Moore,
Gilbert Sussman & C. E. Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop
Payment of Checks—I. Legal Method, 42 YALE L.J. 817 (1933); Underhill Moore, Gilbert
Sussman & C. E. Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of
Checks—II. Institutional Method, 42 YALE L. J. 1198 (1933).
48
Somewhat surprisingly, as Joshua Fischman points out to me, at least two
contemporary scholars hold up Moore as prescient. See Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin,
Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17 (2011). They
suggest that “ridicule” of Moore’s approach is “misplaced” since “in the crucial respect of
research design, Moore’s study was pioneering,” a forerunner of “‘regression discontinuity’
design” as a way of exploring the causal effect of laws on behavior. Id. at 18–19. Their
invocation of Moore, however, seems more for rhetorical effect (they effectively admit his
results were not interesting), and they certainly do not endorse his behaviorism.
49
LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 268.
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application to law was even worse than its application to other aspects of
human behavior. Might it not turn out that rational choice models of
judicial behavior or social psychological results about the behavior of
college students prove similarly unilluminating with the benefit of
distance and hindsight? Perhaps so, though at least one has some reason
to think the cognitive revolution in psychology, to which all the
dominant social-scientific models of human behavior now subscribe,
does seem a genuine advance in the study of human behavior.
The crucial point, however, is that Moore was an outlier who, unlike
the vast majority of American Realists, did not spend most of his time
reading court opinions and disentangling doctrinal rationales from
factual situation-types. Much of social-scientific study of judicial
behavior that today travels under a “realist” banner is much closer to
Moore than most of American Realism, in the sense that it looks for
correlations (which it takes to reveal causal relations) between
characteristics of the inputs and the outcomes of judicial decisions.
Very far from Moore’s behaviorism was Karl Llewellyn, both in his
revolutionary work on commercial law and in his famous study of
dispute resolution among the Cheyenne Indians, undertaken jointly with
the anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel.50 For many years, Llewellyn and
Hoebel’s book was the preeminent example of “field work” in legal
anthropology, one that might seem to put the Realist imprimatur on the
necessity of social science for understanding law. Yet, a careful reading
of the work by anyone familiar with Llewellyn’s jurisprudential views
belies that impression. The point of the book is, quite clearly, to show
that those who resolved disputes among the Cheyene had what
Llewellyn later came to call “situation-sense,” that is, an ability to
perceive the sensible or fair rule both for the case before the court and
beyond. In The Cheyenne Way, Llewellyn described situation-sense as the
“peculiar sureness in the application of felt, living institutional norms,
and peculiar adjustment of the felt ‘rules’ and the treatment of the
particular cases to something bigger and more vital than any ‘rule’ of an
individual case,”51 and also as the “utterly clean juristic intuition,
individualized yet moving with singular consistency whither tribal
welfare demands that it shall move.”52 The great American jurists, says
Llewellyn, did their work “well-nigh as much by intuition as by rational
construct and rational development,”53 and the remarkable achievement
50

See generally K. N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT
(1941).
Id. at 328.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 311.

AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE
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of the Cheyenne was that they “produced . . . a large percentage of work
on a level of which our rarer and greater jurists could be proud,” which
is all “the more notable because explicit law—i.e., law clothed in rules—
was exceedingly rare among them.”54 Yet, the Cheyenne still produced a
“highly predictable consistency in their actual handlings of a whole
sequence of tough, knotty cases.”55 All of Llewellyn’s other work, which
involved reading cases and not visiting Native Americans, is meant to
vindicate the role of this kind of “situation-sense” in adjudication. So
why did Llewellyn turn to anthropological field work here? There is
only one reason as far as I can see, and it is stated candidly in the preface:
it was the only way, he says, to study “the law-ways among primitive
peoples,” namely, those who do not record their decisions in written
opinions.56 In other words, the one major venture by a leading American
Realist into actual field work about “law in action” was necessitated only
by the fact that the so-called “primitive” people he was studying did not
have a tradition of written resolution of their disputes! This is an “old
Realist” argument for social science in rather special circumstances only.
A “new legal realism,” which many scholars now champion, would
continue the paradigm of scholarship established by the old legal
realists, namely, contrasting what courts say they’re doing with what
they actually do. “We are all realists now,” because this is what so many
legal scholars do, including those who know nothing of social science
(like Laycock) and don’t even self-identify as realists (like Posner in the
1970s). None of this is to deny the value of sound empirical work on law
and the legal system. Such work might even illuminate the gap between
what the courts say they’re doing and what they’re actually doing. It is
only to say that the newer forms of legal realism, though they
presuppose the Skeptical Doctrine of the old legal realism, have rather
little to do with the “old legal realism” of the Americans, which had such
a significant impact on American law and legal scholarship and
essentially nothing to do with that of the Scandinavians, which was
concerned, fundamentally, with philosophical questions about where to
locate the phenomenon of a system of legal norms in a world
naturalistically conceived. It is a testament to the impact of the old
Realists that so many newcomers, with little in common and often
diverse agendas, want to claim their mantle.

54
55
56

Id. at 313.
Id. at 319.
Id. at viii.
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